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Note 
Duquet Revisited 
Julius H. GREY* 
En 1977, l'arrêt Duquet c. Ville de Ste-Agathe-des-Monts a réduit 
radicalement le formalisme qui entourait jusque-là au Québec l'octroi du 
jugement déclaratoire sur requête. Suite à Duquet, d'autres arrêts de la Cour 
suprême ont contribué à accentuer ce mouvement et, certainement en droit 
public, le recours au jugement déclaratoire est devenu une simple option, 
dont l'emploi ne devrait pas pouvoir influencer le sort d'un litige. 
Cette évolution doit être placée dans le contexte d'un abandon presque 
total des anciens recours qui compliquaient et rendaient pratiquement 
aléatoire notre droit administratif. Cependant, on doit remarquer une 
réticence, de la part de plusieurs juges, à accepter sans réserve les 
conséquences de Duquet. Le pouvoir d'annuler des lois ou des règlements fait 
parfois l'objet de restrictions. Les mots "intérêts immédiats", de l'article 453 
du Code, reçoivent parfois une interprétation restrictive, et même l'absence 
d'une "difficulté réelle", dans un sens étroit et technique, peut présenter un 
danger. Ces tendances sont loin d'être universelles, mais elles peuvent avoir 
pour résultat d'engendrer chez les avocats une méfiance qui reléguerait 
l'article 453 à la dernière place parmi tous les recours, alors que le juge Pigeon, 
dans Duquet, avait souhaité qu'il soit "largement applicable". 
Le but de cette note est de démontrer qu 'il n 'existe aucune raison, qu 'elle 
soit purement juridique ou pratique, défavoriser de nouvelles restrictions à 
l'octroi du jugement déclaratoire : Duquet devrait être accepté dans son sens 
le plus large. 
* Professeur, Faculté de droit, Université McGill. 
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Introduction 
Declaratory relief in Quebec was traditionally very difficult, at times 
impossible to obtain. ' In 1977 a revolution occurred in the Supreme Court 
and the gates to declaratory relief opened.2 This change was particularly 
evident in administrative law. Motions under Section 453 C.P.C. in 
administrative law were almost always rejected prior to Duquel. After it, 
some liberalization was inevitable. 
The change seemed an eminently welcome one. The traditional public 
law remedies were bristling with complications. Some were available against 
the crown, some were not.3 Some4 were traditinally limited to reviewing 
"judicial" bodies5, others6 applied particularly to "duties" and therefore to 
administrative as well as judicial functions.7 Declaratory relief clearly held 
out the promise of a simple and accessible solution. 
1. See Grey Comment on John Duquelv. Ville de Ste-Agathe de Monts,[\911]2S.C.K. 1132 
in (1978) 24 McGill L.J. All ; see also SARNA Declaratory Judgments, infra, fn. 121. It must 
be noted that the problems associated with declaratory motions would, on the whole, not 
apply to declaratory actions under 462 C.P.C. 
2. Duquel v. Ville de Ste-Agathe des Monts, [1977] 2 S.CR. 1132. 
3. See DE SMITH, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4<h ed., by J. Evans, London, 
Stevens, 1981, chapters 9, 10, II. 
4. Esp. certiorari. 
5. Martineau v. Matsqui Institution N°2, (1978) 40 C.C.C. 2d 325 (F.CA.), reversed at [1980] 
1 S.CR. 602. 
6. Esp. mandamus. 
1. Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food, [1968] A.C. 997, (1968) 2 W.L.R. 
924, [1968] I All E.R. 694. 
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It would seem that, a decade later, it is time to assess the effects of 
Duquel and the extent to which the promise was fulfilled. 
1. Trends in Canadian Public Law 
The development of jurisprudence under Art. 453 C.P.C. cannot be 
understood outside the principal trends of our public law.8 
Those who thought that Duquel was an isolated decision dealing with 
one form of relief must have been jolted when a year later, the Supreme Court 
delivered an even more far-reaching judgment in Vachon v. A-G Quebec9. 
That case set out to destroy the proceduralism that had plagued our 
administrative law since its inception early in the century.I0 Too long the 
question had been whether the appropriate relief had been sought and not 
whether justice required judicial intervention. A great number of applications 
fell on preliminary exceptions with the merits never considered by anyone. 
Mr. Justice Pigeon ended this tradition with these words : 
In my view, the theory of nullity for some formal defects, elaborated in the cases 
on which the decisions in question are based, is contrary to the principles of the 
present Code of Civil Procedure. It is quite true that the Art. 834 prohibits 
evocation and certain other remedies without prior authorization, but nowhere 
does the Code prohibit a declaratory action or a motion for a declaratory 
judgment in respect of claims that may be urged by an extraordinary remedy 
contemplated in this article. The Code has abolished the exceptions to the form 
which at least involved the rule that irregularities were waived by failure to take 
advantage of them within very short time limits (Art. 176 of the 1896 Code). 
Under the cases on which the decisions now in question are based, however, any 
error in the choice of remedy results in a nullity which can be pleaded at any 
time, even on appeal. In the instant cases it does not appear that the point on 
which the decisions are based was in any way raised at first instance. In Duquet 
v. The Town of Ste-Agathe 13 N.R. 160; [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1132, a unanimous 
decison of this Court held on the question of procedure (at P. 172 N. R., p. 1142 
S.C.R.) that: 
(1) in order to decide whether a case can be dealt with by a motion for 
declaratory judgment, the Court is not required to determine if the motion is 
preventive or curative but merely whether it comes within the terms of Art. 453 ; 
(2) as the distinction is not a rule of public order, any party who wished to 
complain that an action should have been instituted must do so when the 
motion is presented, and he shall be considered to have waived this objection if 
he files a contestation in writing. 
8. While it is true that 453 C.P.C. is not limited to public law, it developed parallel to the 
public law remedies and the leading cases were all in the field of public law. 
9. Vachon v. A.-G. Quebec, (1979) 25 N.R. 399; [1979] 1 S.C.R. 555. 
10. For this author's view of the history of administrative law, see J.H. GREY, The Ideology of 
Administrative Law, (1983) 13 Manitoba L.J. 35. 
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In my view, the same general principles must be applied when the question is 
whether the appropriate procedure is an ordinary action or an application for 
evocation. The only consequence of resorting to an action or to a motion for a 
declaration rather than to an application for evocation in a case coming within 
Art. 846 C.C.P., is that the Plaintiff does not obtain a staying order. " 
Article 453 C.P.C. was thus explicitly made one of the alternative forms 
of judicial review.I2 This is admirably and succinctly expressed by the 
Honourable Mr. Justice Dugas in St-Sauveur v. Jolicœur et al: 
La requête pour jugement déclaratoire est un des moyens reconnus de faire 
appel à l'exercice des pouvoirs de contrôle et de surveillance de la Cour 
supérieure comme monsieur le juge Pratte le souligne dans l'extrait de 
FARRAH que j 'a i cité page 271.1 3 
AU of these cases, including Vachon l4 appear deeply rooted in particular 
Quebec legislation, especially the Code of Civil Procedure. Yet one should 
not view them as manifestations of a parochial trend. Pigeon J. applied the 
entire line of permissive cases on matters or procedure to non-Quebec matters 
in C. U.P.E. v. University of Saskatchewan l5. Other cases from common law 
provinces showed the same tendency.I6 In Martineau v. Matsqui Institution 
No 2 n the Supreme Court did for Federal Court cases exactly what it had 
done in Vachon i8 for Quebec ones, by opening the door to review 
notwithstanding the legislative draftsman's valiant efforts to prevent this.19 
In Beson v. Director of Child Welfare of Newfoundland, Madame Justice 
Wilson said : 
11. Vachon, supra, f.n. 9, p. 412. 
12. Along with evocation and the direct action in nullity. Presumably, relief could also be 
justified under 462 C.P.C. 
13. St-Sauveur v. Jolicœur et al, [1979] C S . 268 p. 272. It is to be noted that Dugas J. traced the 
"progressive" trend beyond Vachon to Farrah v. A.-G. Quebec, [1978] S.C.R. 638. 
Presumably, he could also have mentioned Three Rivers Boatman v. Canada Labour 
Relations Board, [ 1969] S C R . 607. See also Le Centre d'Accueil Notre Dame du perpétuel 
secours v. P.-G. Quebec, [1978] CS . 985 (Vallerand J.) where, with more reluctance, 
Vallerand J. as the then was. 
14. Vachon, supra, fn. 9. 
15. University of Saskatchewan et al v. C. U.P.E., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 830. 
16. See, for instance, Juda v. Paterson, (1982) 39 O.R. 737 (HCJ). 
17. Martineau N" 2, supra, fn. 5. 
18. Vachon, supra, fn. 9. 
19. The Federal Court, in many ways the most conservative court in the country resisted the 
changes more than most. For instance in C.I.A.C. v. The Queen et al, [ 1984] 2 F.C 866, the 
Court, by a split decision refused to declare injunction applicable to the crown. At roughly 
the same time in Protestant School Board v. A.-G. Quebec, [1985] C S . 872. Brossard J. did 
the opposite in Quebec's Superior Court. It is submitted that Mr. Justice Brossard was 
entirely right on this point as was Mr. Justice Hugessen in dissent in the Federal Court. But 
see P.-G. Quebec v. Laurendeau, [1985] C.A. 494 for a more conservative, Quebec view of 
this matter. 
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Moreover, an application for judicial review might well have been successful on 
the ground of the Director's failure to treat the Besons fairly [...] The 
Newfoundland Court of Appeal found as a fact that they had been treated 
unfairly. [...] However, instead of proceeding by way of judicial review the 
appellant instituted habeas corpus proceedings and the Newfoundland Courts 
concluded, in my view wrongly, that they were without jurisdiction to deal with 
the matter, I have concluded that it was open to them to proceed with judicial 
review in exercise of their parens patriae jurisdiction.20 
In short, the just solution must prevail over procedural niceties, not only 
in Quebec, because of the Code, but throughout Canada.2 I 
If this is so, it must not matter that a procedure is taken under Art. 453 
C.P.C. if it can succeed under any other provision. Indeed, no rule exists 
against cumulation of the remedies in one procedure. In Canada Steamship 
Lines v. La Commission de la Santé et de la Sécurité du travail. Gomery J. 
stated this as follows : 
The Court is asked by Petitioner's motion to declare generally that the policy 
adopted by the C.S.S.T. is null and illegal. In this respect the motion includes 
conclusions similar to those that would be found in a motion for declaratory 
judgment under article 453 C.P.C. There is no procedural reason why a motion 
in evocation cannot include such a request, but always on conditions that the 
Petitioner prove that it has the necessary interest.22 
An even more radical step was taken by the Supreme Court in Jimenez-
Perez v. M.E.I.23 in which the court set aside long-standing restrictions on 
granting declaratory relief by way of originating motions2 4 and reaffirming 
its right to grant declaratory relief instead of or in addition to any other relief 
under Section 18 of the Federal Act. 
20. Beson v.. Director of Child Welfare of Newfoundland, (1982) 44 N.R. 602, p. 612. (S.C.C.) 
21. Indeed, it could be argued that the rest of Canada was far more advanced along this road 
before Vachon, supra, fn. 9. 
22. Canada Steamship Lines v. La Commission de la Santé et de la Sécurité du travail, [1985] 
CS. , 745 p. 751. Support for this position is found in Mr. Justice Montgomery's judgment 
in École Commerciale Bluteau v. Morin et al, [1978] C.A. 186. 
23. Jimenez-Perez v. M.E.I., [1985] C S . 13. 
24. B. v. Commission of Inquiry, [1975] F C . 602 (F.C.T.D). It remains to be seen whether the 
Federal Court views Jimenez-Perez, supra, fn. 23 as an anomaly or adopts its 
consequences. 
In Canadian Newspapers Co. Ltd. v. A.-G. Canada, (1985) 49 O.R. (2d) 557, the distinction 
between statement of claim and motion was similarly (and properly) blurred. At page 572-
73 Howland CJO said : 
It is important that persons who allege that their rights under the Charter have been 
infringed should have an opportunity of having their legal position determined 
expeditiously. The appellant should not be prevented from obtaining the declaratory relief 
to which it was entitled because it proceeded by originating notice rather than by 
commencing an action. 
However, that was a Charter case with all the advantages of Section 24 of the Charter. 
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One can conclude, then, that the Duquet25 "revolution" has been 
surpassed by a total change in attitude towards remedies and procedure.2 6 
The liberal trend is further enhanced by the expansion of the horizons of 
declaratory relief on the merits throughout Canada. 
Declaratory relief had always been relatively flexible whenever 
permitted. Unlike the other remedies, it applied against the Crown.2 7 In the 
last ten years, this flexibility reached its apogee in two Supreme Court cases, 
both from the Federal Court, Solosky v. The Queenn and Kelso v. The 
Queen29. Both these judgments said, in essence, that no a priori limit existed 
on the Courts ' power to declare. In Solosky, Dickson J. added : 
The jurisdiction of the court to grant declaratory relief was again stated, in the 
broadest language, in Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v. Dickson 
[ [ 1970] A.C. 403 (H.L.) ], a case in which the applicant sought a declaration that 
a proposed motion of the pharmaceutical society, if passed, would be ultra vires 
its objects and an unreasonable restraint of trade. In the course of hisjudgment, 
Lord Upjohn stated, at p. 433 : 
A person whose freedom of action is challenged can always come to the court 
to have his rights and position clarified, subject always, of course, to the right 
of the court in exercise of its judicial discretion to refuse relief in the 
circumstances of the case. 
[•••] 
H owever poorly framed the prayer for relief may be, even as twice amended, the 
present claim is clearly directed to the procedures for handling prison mail and 
the invocation in relation thereto of solicitor-client privilege. It is not directed to 
the characterization of specific and individual items of correspondence. If the 
Appellant is entitled to a declaration, it is within this Court's discretion to settle 
the wording of the declaration : see de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action (3rd ed. 1973, p. 431). Further, s. 50 of the Supreme Court Act allows the 
Court to make amendments necessary to a determination of the "real issue", 
without application by the parties.29a 
It was no longer necessary to worry about errors in the formulation of 
the proposed declaration. The Court could modify it, so as to say what it felt it 
could legally declare.30 
25. Duquel, supra, fn. 2. 
26. See also Brazeau v. Comité d'Arbitrage du Barreau, [1981] CS. 353 (Hugessen ACJ) 
27. See Dyson v. Attorney General, [1911] 1 K.B. 480, Quebec Association of Protestant 
School Boards v. A.-G. Quebec, [1982] CS. 783. Deschenes CJ affirmed [1983] CA. and 
[1984] S.C.R. and Griffin v. Commission régionale Blanville Deux Montagnes, (1986) 
J.E. 87-39 (Legault J). 
28. Solosky v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821. 
29. Kelso v. The Queen, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 199. 
29". Supra, note 28, p. 831 and 833. 
30. Presumably, the penalty for gross error in phrasing would come in the attribution of costs. 
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In Kelso31, the argument that the declaration was pointless because the 
transfer of Mr. Kelso had already taken place was rejected. If such a defence 
were permitted, the government could ensure its eternal success by decisive 
action in every case. The very notion of the rule of law demanded that Mr. 
Kelso be held to have an interest even after the transfer. 
Jimenez-Perez32 also shows the Supreme Court's impatience with 
technical limits to declaratory relief. The limit, in the Court's view is 
discretionary. In Solosky Mr. Justice Dickson said : 
Once one accepts that the dispute is real and that the granting of judgment is 
discretionary, then the only further issue is whether the declaration is capable of 
having any practical effect in resolving the issues in the case.33 
In Quebec, a recent Court of Appeal decision shows the constantly 
expanding scope of declaratory motions. The most accepted traditional 
truism about declarations was that they could not order the payment of a sum 
of money.34 Now, Mr. Justice Kaufman puts the following gloss on the 
truism : 
When asked at the hearing by what right the appeal was taken de piano, counsel 
for the Appellant pointed to the special nature of the recourse provided for in 
Article 453 C.P. The Court, he said (quite rightly), was asked to resolve a 
genuine problem arising from the law and the contract. However, where the 
amount in issue can be quanitifed — and here it can — I see no reason why this 
should not be done, particularly in view of Article 456 C.P., which clearly 
provides that a declaratory judgment "has the same effect and is subject to the 
same recourses as any other final judgment."35 
The broadly remedial nature of Article 453 is clear, too, from the words 
of Tyndale J. A. in La Chambre des Huissiers du Québec et al v. Lussier : 
It seems to me that the parties, the public and justice would be better served by a 
decision on the merits ; the question is of considerable consequence, and if an 
answer can be given, in spite of problems of procedure, interest, or capacity, it is 
desirable to give it.36 
31. Kelso, supra, fn. 29. 
32. Jiminez-Perez, supra, fn. 23. 
33. Solosky, supra, fn. 28, p. 833. 
34. Even Duquet preserved that. 
35. Gauthier v. L'Impériale-Compagnie d'Assurance- Vie, [1985] R.D.J. 461,463. On the issue 
of finality of 453 C.P.C. judgments see also Société St-Jean Baptiste v. C. U.M., [1981] C.A. 
168 esp. 174. 
36. La Chambre des Huissiers du Québec et al v. Lussier, [1984] C.A. 58, p. 59. There is no 
doubt that all of the restrictive decisions listed below conflict with this clear prescription of 
the Court of Appeal. In Laforesl c. Paradis et al, S.C. 500-05-007514-860, at page 7, 
Tannanbaum J. also adopted a "liberal" view based on the notion of "public interest" 
which required a judgment on the merits. 
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Once again, the trend initiated by Duquet37 has continued over ten years 
and has carried us well beyond the original decision in a sensible and salutory 
way. Declaratory relief appears "generally available" as Pigeon J. stipulated 
it should be.38 
Here, however, one observes a strange phenomenon. Despite the 
apparent availability of declaratory relief39, it is still not an entirely safe 
remedy to choose. Almost every attempt is greeted by a motion to dismiss.40 
Such motions are occasionally successful41 and they are certainly a factor in 
discouraging the use of the remedy. It is therefore necessary to see in detail 
what difficulties still exists and whether they can be justified. 
2. The Problem of "quashing" by declaration 
The wording of Section 453 could suggest that the court can declare 
rights under a written instrument, but not annul the instrument. Often, this is 
a casuistic distinction. Surely, if one annuls a regulation or by-law one is 
declaring rights under a statute.42 If one annuls a will, one is declaring rights 
under the Civil Code. The problem would thus only arise, if the rights are 
common law rights. The issue would still be important, however, because 
written decisions could be annulled for breach of the common law only to act 
fairly.43 
If one went so far as to prevent the annulling of decisions of boards for 
reasons of fairness, one would be in direct violation of Vachon.44 Such a 
position is not presently tenable. However, somejudges have erected a barrier 
to the annulling of statutes, regulations or contracts by means of 453 C.P.C. 
37. Duquet, supra, fn. 2. 
38. Duquet, supra, fn. 2. Of course, the Courts have a discretion to refuse relief at all times. This 
is made clear by Solosky supra, fn. 28 and O'Reilly v. Mackman, [1982] 3 W.L.R. 1096 
(H of L). 
39. Or, at least, a declaratory motion under Art. 453 (as contrasted with a declaratory action 
under Art. 462). 
40. Despite the Court of Appeal's general disapproval of such motions. 
41. E.g. Association des Policiers Provinciaux du Québec v. A.-G. Quebec, J E . 86-486 
(Arsenault J). 
42. The regulation can only be valid if authorized by statute Re Chemicals Reference, [1943] 
S.C.R. 1. 
43. As happened in Le Régime des Rentes des Employés du Québec v. Paquet Syndicat Inc., 
S.C. 200-05-0012520845 (Doiron J.). 
44. Vachon, supra, fn. 9 but see infra discussions of certain judgments that do appear to place 
restrictions on judicial review under 453 C.P.C. 
An important judgment applying Vachon, supra, fn. 9 is La Fédération des Affaires 
Sociales v. Syndicat Canadien de la Fonction Publique et al, S.C.M. 500-05-009427-855, 
April 16 1985 (Viau J). It, too, cannot stand together with Mr. Justice Brossard's view. 
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The most remarkable example of this trend is undoubtedly The 
Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal v. P.-G. Quebec.*5 In this 
decision Mr. Justice Brossard went through a large number of cases where 
declarations annulling such instruments were granted. 
He noted that in Duquel46 by-laws were annulled through acquiesence 
and that the same applied to Quebec Association of Protestant School 
Boards.47 
With far more difficulty, he finds several decisions of the Court of 
Appeal not pertinent to the issue.48 Finally, and, with respect, wrongly, he 
holds Forget v. P.-G. Que.*9 and McKenna Inc. v. Office de la Langue 
française50 to be decided per incuriam and cites some Superior Court 
authorities51 as authority for a restrictive view. 
It is submitted that the position that one cannot annul by declaratory 
relief is untenable. In Forget52 the matter was fully debated at first instance. 
The Court of Appeal did not discuss it, it is true, but assumed that Mr. Justice 
Pinard was correct on that point. The government continued to argue that 
453 C.P.C. did not apply in the Court of Appeal. The decision cannot stand 
without that assumption. 
Even more significant is the fact that in other Canadian jurisdictions 
declaratory relief is available to annul regulations and statutes. Solosky5i 
proceeded on the assumption that this could be done.54 Under Section 24 of 
45. The Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal v. P.-G. Quebec et al, [1986] R. J.Q. 48 
(Brossard J.) (presently under appeal). 
46. Duquel, supra, fn. 2. 
47. Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards, supra, fn. 19. 
48. Société St-Jean Baptiste de Montréal v. C. U.M., [1981] CA. 168 and Syndicat National de 
l'Amiante d'Asbestos Inc. v. Nadeau, [1985] C.A. 62. 
49. Forget v. P.-G. Que., [1984» C.A. 492. See also Chrétien v. Les Centres d'Accueil 
Lanaudière, [1984] C S . 848 where resolutions were annulled by 453 C.P.C. 
One can also cite Droit de la Famille — 153, [1984] C S . 684 where Marquis J. declared an 
agreement valid. Presumably, he could have also declared it void. Another important case 
is entreprises Anical Gauthier v. Ville de Sept-fles, [1983] C S . 709 where a by-law was 
annulled (Richard J.) See also Kronstrom v. P.-G. Quebec, [1983] C S . 795 (Larouche J.) 
and Conseil Scolaire de l'île de Montréal v. P.-G. Quebec, J.E. 81-579. Another very liberal 
decision is found in Amusecor Inc. v. 113475 Canada Inc., S.C. 500-05-010983-854 
(Greenberg J.). See also Hébert v. Ville d'Outremont [1986] D.L.Q. I (Cutler J.). 
50. McKenna Inc. v. Office de la Langue française, C S . Montréal 500-05-002007-845 
(Vaillancourt J.). 
51. Service Sanitaire Verdun (1980) Inc. v. A.-G. Quebec, (1984) S.C. 500-05-005907-835; 
Neider v. Gulf Canada Liée, [1982] C S . 298. 
52. Forgel v. P.-G. Que., supra, l'n. 49. 
53. Solosky, supra, fn. 28. 
54. Ultimately, Solosky lost on the merits. 
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the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, it appears that a motion in 
nullity can lie.55 Why would it be otherwise in Quebec? 
It is important to remember that since two years, evocation and 
mandamus are no longer actions with a writ but simple motions. No one 
would question the power to annul on evocation.56 To suggest that one type 
of motion (Art. 453) is more limited than another is no longer even a matter of 
procedure. It is pure formalism. The sole distinction in many cases becomes 
the name or title used in the motion. 
A similar difficulty has been raised by some judges about annulling 
judicial or quasi-judicial decisions. If 453 C.P.C. is to be a form of judicial 
review then some "decisions" will have to fall under it. However in Société 
d'Énergie de la Baie James v. CSNS1, Bisaillon J. categorically refused to 
consider an attack on or indeed an interpretation of an arbitration judgment 
under 453 C. P.C. This view was endorsed by Riopel J. in Lavigne v. Paquin58 
and, in a cryptic sentence by Nolin J. in Chretien.59 
In view of Vachon60 these cases must be wrong. To allow administrative 
decisions to be quashed or interpreted but not quasi-judicial ones means 
bringing back the old distinction between functions which was supposed to 
end with cases like St-Hilaire v. Begin61 and MNR v. Coopers and 
Lybrand.62 At one time it was possible to argue that 846 C.P.C. applied to 
quasi-judicial decisions and 453 C.P.C. to administrative ones. Such 
reasoning makes little sense in terms of policy and has been very shaky since 
Vachon63. It is important to note that Bisaillon J. did not consider Vachon in 
Société d'Énergie. M His view that 453 C.P.C. must be restrictively interpreted 
has surely been superceded.65 
The most important consideration is that of utility. Procedure is not a 
subject of theoretical significance. What matters is that cases proceed 
55. See Griffin, supra, fn. 27 and the quotes found in it. 
56. See Ohayon v. City of Cole St. Luc, [1986] R.J.Q. 2731 (Reeves J.) and the jurisprudence 
cited there. 
57. Société d'Énergie de la Baie James v. C.S.N., [1979] C S . 259. 
58. Lavigne v. Paquin, [1981] C S . 896. 
59. Chrétien, supra, fn. 49. 
60. Vachon, supra, fn. 9. 
61. St-Hilaire v. Begin, [1982] CA. 25. 
62. MNR v. Coopers & Lybrand, [1979] 1 S.CR. 495. See also Martineau N° 2, supra, fn. 5 
and Fraternité Interprovinciale des Ouvriers en Électricité v. O.C.Q., [1983] CA. 7, esp. 
per Turgeon JA. 
63. Vachon, supra, fn. 9. 
64. Société dÉnergie, supra, fn. 57. 
65. See infra, section VI for a consideration of the reasons for some later, seemingly restrictive 
interpretations. 
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expeditiously and fairly. It is difficult to discover any utility or justification to 
a restriction of Section 453. Why should the result of litigation depend on 
reasonable choices made by lawyers in difficult areas of litigation, where no 
prejudice whatsoever is suffered by the opposite party? 
The Protestant School Board66 case is thus compatible neither with 
Vachon61 nor with the equally well-known decision St-Hilaire v. Begin6* 
where it was decided that procedural errors can have nefarious effects for the 
Parties whose lawyers made them only if there was prejudice. 
In Voghelv. A.-G. Quebec69, shortly after Duquet70 the Court of Appeal 
expressed fear that the order of the roll and the fairness which requires every 
litigant to be dealt with in turn will be disturbed by the change in law. 
Experience now shows us that no such catastrophe occurred. One might more 
reasonably maintain that the quick solution to cases which lend themselves to 
it liberates the roll and makes it easier for other litigants to be heard. 
The conclusion is that the Protestant School Board11 judgment is 
incompatible with the leading jurisprudence, contrary to all trends, and not 
desirable as a result. It should not be followed.72 
3. The problem of immediate interest 
Mr. Justice Brossard also favours a restrictive interpretation of 
"immediate interest".73 There is considerable jurisprudence supporting this 
66. The Protestant School Board, supra, fn. 19. 
67. Vachon, supra, fn. 9 where we are told that "the only consequence of resorting to an action 
or to... a motion for a declaration... rather than... evocation... is that the Plaintiff does not 
obtain a staying order." 
68. St-Hilaire v. Begin, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 79. 
69. Voghelv. A.-G. Quebec, [1977] C.A. 197. 
70. Duquet, supra, fn. 2. 
71. The Protestant School Board, supra, fn. 19. It must be admitted that some judges, other 
than Brossard J. have expressed similar views. See for instance Flamer v. Bell Canada, 
S.C., 500-05-001-115-862(Forger J.), Jolicœurv. Syndicat des Salariés de Lainages Victor, 
J.E. 86T-188 (Masson J.), Conaco Industries Ltd. v. P.-G. Quebec, S.C. 405-05-000042-84 
(Biron J.), De Dona v. P.-G. Quebec, S.C, 500-05-007414-848. These cases, it is submitted, 
are all too restrictive and do not serve the ends of justice. 
72. It must be added, (though this author does not regard this point as significant), that it is also 
"obiter" and therefore technically not as persuasive as if it were not. At the time of printing 
the Court of Appeal has rendered its judgment. Although it confirmed Brossard J's 
decision on the merits, two of the three judges appear to have rejected its position on 453 
C.P.C. The matter is not, however, as clear as one may wish. 
73. The Protestant School Board, supra, fn. 19, p. 58. See also Dallaire v. Corporation 
Municipale de Point-au-Pic, (1986), S.C. 240-05-000101-866 (De Blois J.) for a restrictive 
view. See also Pimparé v. Société de Raffinage et Marketing, [1983] CS . 806 (Brassard J.). 
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view and one is forced to accept that the word "immediate" must have a 
purpose. However, all it may mean is that the interest should not be purely 
speculative or eventual. It may exclude from the aegis of 453 C.P.C. 
petitioners such as Thorson74, McNeill15, or Borowski16 who are taking on a 
battle in which they do not have a personal interest in the strict sense. A better 
view would be that, once the interest exists, it need not be "personal". It is 
possible however, that the interest does not exist unless it is personal, save in 
constitutional matters.77 In Conseil du Patronat du Québec v. Commission 
de la Santé et de la Sécurité du travail11, Mr. Justice Biron stated that cases 
like Borowski19 would apply to 453 C.P.C. but interpreted them as having 
effect only if there is no other means of bringing the action80. In any case, this 
matter is unlikely to arise frequently since most persons raising issues in 
which they are not directly implicated invoke the Charter and can rely on 
Section 24 for a remedy rather than 453 C.P.C. However, one would certainly 
advise a "theoretical" petitioner to proceed under a different provision of 
law.81 In short, there must be some limit to 453 created by the words 
"immediate interest", but that limit is not a serious barrier to the frequent use 
of the section. 
A reasonable explanation of this issue would be to state that "interest" 
means the same thing it means in any other area of law and that any difficulty 
is associated with the word "immediate". But a good interpretation of that 
74. Thorson v. A.-G. Canada, [1975] I S.C.R. 138. 
75. McNeill v. Nova Scolia Censorship Board, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265. 
76. Borowski v. Minister of Justice Canada, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575. 
77. Jeunes Canadiens pour une civilisation chrétienne v. Fondation du Théâtre du Nouveau 
Monde, [1974] C.A. 491. In short. cases like Thorson, supra. In 74, McNeill, supra, fn 75, 
and Borowski, supra, fn. 76, depend on their constitutional or Charter nature. But this 
theory is put in doubt by Minister of Finance Canada v. Finlay, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607. 
78. Conseil du Patronal du Québec v. Commission de la Santé et de la Sécurité du travail, 
[1984] C.S. 466. This is a more logical distinction than "constitutional nature". See Woods 
v. Régie de logement, [1984] C.S. 774. 
79. Borowski, supra, fn. 64. 
80. I.e., as long as no one has a "better" or more direct interest and the matter could thus never 
be considered. But this may not be fully compatible with McNeil, supra, fn. 75. See also 
Maryland Casualty Company v. Société Asbestos Limitée, [1986] R.J.Q. 817 where 
Brassard J. held that the interest must relate directly to the Petitioner. This would seem too 
rigid. 
81. Although he would have to justify his interest under Section 59 C.P. whatever route he 
chose. But Tyndale JA's words in La Chambre des Huissiers, supra, fn. 36, go a long way to 
eliminating all difficulties. See also Corporation Professionnelle de Physiolhérapeules du 
Québec v. Laurin, [1982] C.S. 781 (Turmel J.) and Quebec Association of Protestant 
School Boards et al v. P.-G. Canada et al, 500-05-008865-824 (Deschênes C.J.) This is the 
interlocutory judgment of August 9, 1982 and not the well-known final judgment on the 
merits. 
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word is that it seeks to prevent litigants from obtaining opinions on law where 
these will not resolve the entire dispute. In short, this is a reenactment of the 
general principle that ineffective declarations will not be granted.82 A 
declaratory motion cannot become an alternative form of the now defunct 
partial inscription in law by which portions of cases would be settled in 
advance. 
4. The issue of "real difficulty" 
Section 453 is supposed to settle questions of "real difficulty". In 
Association des Policiers83 Mr. Justice Arsenault decided the answer was too 
plain and refused the declaration. This, it is submitted, is not a desirable 
result. What is "difficult" for one person is simple for another. What can be 
more frustrating than being told that the answer is obvious, when you do not 
find it so ? 
Curiously, Benoit J. came to the opposite conclusion in Woods v. Régie 
du Logement et al when he said at page 784 : 
Enfin, j 'aimerais ajouter qu'un jugement déclaratoire ne peut et ne doit pas être 
un traité de droit et en l'occurrence un traité de droit sur la compétence 
exclusive de l'avocat et du notaire ni un traité de ce qui constitue l'usurpation 
des fonctions de l'avocat. Je veux spécialement dire que la Cour ne pourrait, 
sans entrer dans des distinctions complexes, prononcer sur les conclusions 
recherchées. En effet, comment la Cour pourrait déclarer la compétence 
exclusive des avocats, conseillers en loi et notaires à répondre à des demandes de 
renseignements?84 
It is submitted that "real difficulty" referred to a real difference of 
opinion or dispute85, not to the degree of doubt entertained by the Judge. 
Both judgments are wrong and it is sufficient that the applicant have a real 
82. See Boisjoly v. Centre d'Accueil Domrémy-Montréal et al, [1986] R.J.Q. 539 at p. 537 
(Martin J.) See especially North Island Laurentian Teachers' Union v. Commission 
Scolaire de Laurenval, [1984] R.D.J. 651 where a seemingly "restrictive" Court of Appeal 
decision ultimately does not do more than decide that the remedy will not be effective. 
83. Association des Policiers, supra, fn. 41. 
84. Woods v. Régie du logement et al, supra, fn. 78. This case is also interesting on the issue of 
"interest" and it came to the same conclusion as Conseil du Patronat, supra, fn. 78. It 
appeared to assume that regulations could be invalidated by 453 C.P.C. and on that point, 
this author is in agreement. On the other hand, the case has a "restrictive" tone which is 
regrettable. 
85. See Corporation Professionnelle des Physiolhérapeules, supra, fn. 81 where Turmel J. said 
at page 786 "La difficulté dont parle l'article 453 C.P. peut être assimilée au terme 
'différend'." 
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problem. The Court should not leave him in the dark because he should have 
known better86 or because the problem is too difficult.87 
5. The Problem of Zarolega 
The most serious problem with respect to 453 C.P.C. is raised by Les 
Terraces Zarolega v. COJO.88 The problem is related to one concerning the 
quashing of laws. Can Art. 453 be used to declare a decision of an inferior 
tribunal void or inoperative? 
Undoubtedly, in the bygone days of strict observance of procedure, the 
answer would be negative. In Punton v. Ministry of Pensions 89 the English 
courts said that one cannot create two subsisting, contradictory decisions, 
one by the inferior tribunal and one by the Court. Which would, in such 
circumstances, be susceptible of execution? 
The traditional theory would have required certiorari90 to quash before 
the Court could declare the law. It is not necessary to insist that, if this is still 
so, the whole view of 453 C.P.C. as an alternative procedure for judicial 
review, endorsed by Vachon91 is meaningless, and all the cases granting 
judicial review under that article are necessarily wrong.92 
Such a thought, implausible though it appears, may occur to lawyers 
reading Pouliot v. C. U.M.93 where the following passage is found : 
86. Of course, as we saw in Solosky, supra, fn. 28, the Court has a discretion. The flimsiness of 
an argument can be evidence that no real dispute exists. 
87. Subject, again, to a discretion to refer the matter to the Master of the Rolls for a full trial. 
88. Us Terraces Zarolega v. COJO, [1981] I S.C.R. 94. 
89. Punton v. Ministry of Pensions, [1964] 1 W.L.R. 226. In Wade Administrative Law, 5th ed., 
pages 529-30, the learned author wisely points out that this doctrine might exclude review 
of errors of law on the face of the record by means of declaratory relief. Wade goes on to say 
that, in modern times, this should make no difference because of the simplification of 
procedures and the fact that certiorari and declaratory relief should co-exist in the same 
procedure. The same principles would apply to Quebec. See also Pyx Granite Estates Ltd. 
v. Ministry of Housing, [ 1960] A. C. 260, Slough Estates v. Slough Borough Council ( 1968) 
299, and Ealing C.B.C. v. Race Relations Board, [1972] A.C. 342. See also Boisjoly, supra, 
fn. 82. 
90. Vachon, supra, fn. 9. 
91. Vachon, supra, fn. 9. 
92. In addition to the many cases cited above, one case Moss v. Queen Elizabeth Hospital, 
(1984), S.C. 500-05-008971-838 where Hannan J. held he had the power to declare a 
decision to reduce a doctor's time in emergency void, but declined to do so on the merits, 
and Vallerand v. Le Barreau du Québec, (1981), S.C. 500-05-013230-816 where Boisvert J. 
declared null a decision of the Bar with respect to a student's average grade needed to pass. 
93. Pouliot v. C.U.M., [1985] C.A. 633. 
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En droit, il y a une présomption de validité à l'égard des décisions rendues par 
des organismes quasi-judiciaires. Si on veut prétendre que ces organismes ont 
[...] excédé leur juridiction, le moyen d'attaquer leur décision est l'évocation.94 
It is submitted that Mr. Justice Nichols was not returning to pre-
Vachon95 distinctions, but rather applying the doctrine of Zarolega.96 In 
both Pouliot91 and Zarolega9*, petitioners wanted a declaration without 
alleging any excess of jurisdiction. In Pouliot99, Petitioners claimed that an 
intra vires decision should be inoperative because it contradicted another 
intra vires decision. In Zarolega l0° they wanted to avoid the legally created 
arbitration altogether or to tie its hands through a superior court judgment. If 
either had succeeded, not only would 453 C.P.C. be a means of judicial 
review, but it would constitute a major expansion of judicial review. A 
procedural provision should not have this effect. Mr. Justice Nichols had 
forseen this danger in Bonneau v. La Commission des Transports du 
Québecl01 where he said : 
Il (l'art. 453) ne crée pas un nouveau pouvoir de surveillance ou de contrôle de la 
Cour Supérieure différent de celui que présentent les articles 33 et 846.102 
It is unlikely that he meant, in Pouliotl03, that, if Petitioner meant to 
challenge the validity of the decision he had to entitle his procedure 
"evocation". Such a holding would at most lead to a minor amendment 
during the hearing. What he meant — and that is an ancient limit all of 
judicial review — is that one cannot obtain an effective appeal from intra 
vires, reasonable decisions, by applying to the Superior court and that one 
cannot avoid the administrative instances through the intercession of the 
Superior Court.I04 
94. Id., p. 635-636. 
95. Vachon, supra, fn. 9. 
96. Zarolega, supra, fn. 88. It is, however, surprising that Zarolega is not cited. 
97. Pouliot, supra, fn. 93. 
98. Zarolega, supra, fn. 88. 
99. Pouliot, supra, fn. 93. 
100. Zarolega, supra, fn. 88. 
101. Bonneau v. La Commission des Transports du Québec, [1981] C S . 268. 
102. Id., p. 270-27'I. 
103. Pouliot, supra, fn. 93. 
104. That point is also made by Harelkin v. University of Regina, [1979] 2 S.CR. 561. See also 
Tessier v. Ouvriers Unis du Caoutchouc, [1984] C S . 1063 (Reeves J). See also Campisi v. 
P.-G. Quebec, [1978] CA. 520. (One should note, too, certain doubts of Montgomery J.A. 
in Campisi as to the majority's view on this). 
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It follows that nothing stops a party from asking for a declaration of 
nullity of a decision affecting him for any of the reasons known to 
administrative law, but he cannot ask for an opinion about the merits of what 
an administrative tribunal has decided or is to decide within its jurisdiction. 
6. Some evidentiary difficulties 
Recent reforms to the Code of Civil Procedure have provided for proof 
by circumstantial affidavit in the extraordinary remedies l05 and interlocutory 
injunctions.I06 Although a motion under 453 C.P.C. can clearly be presented 
in the same procedure l07 it does not appear, on the face of it, to be included in 
the circumstantial affidavit articles. 
Despite the restrictive attitude of a few judges, the Code of Procedure 
seems to make it a right to present oral evidence in addition to the 
affidavits l08 where affidavit evidence is permitted. It is probably wise, 
whenever the facts are in dispute and there is serious doubt about the 
availability of the extraordinary recourses, to establish the basis for a 
declaratory judgment by oral evidence. The procedural obstacles to judicial 
review become less serious once that is done.109 
105. Art. 835.3 : A party may make his proof by means of sufficiently detailed affidavits to 
establish all the facts necessary to support his pretensions. If he so elects, he must cause his 
affidavits to be served on the adverse party and filed as soon as possible before presentation 
of the motion. However, the party making the motion must cause his affidavits to be served 
at the same time as the motion. 
In addition to proof by affidavit, any party may present oral proof, if he so wishes. 
106. Art 754.1 : The parties make their proof by means of affidavits sufficiently detailed to 
establish all the facts necessary to support their pretensions. They must file the affidavits 
and all the documents they intend to invoke at the proof and hearing and cause them to be 
served on the adverse party as soon as possible before presentation of the motion. However, 
the party making the motion must cause his affidavits to be served at the same time as the 
motion. 
With leave from the court, the parties may also produce documents at the hearing. 
107. Canada Streamship Lines, supra, fn. 22. There is no logical reason to segregate these 
procedures. 
108. Art. 835.3 says in part: 
In addition to proof by affidavit, any parly may present oral proof, if he so wishes. 
Art. 754.2 is to the same effect. 
109. Of course, an amendement to the Code is highly desirable on this point, so as to include 453 
C.P.C. among procedures in which the factual basis may be proved by affidavit evidence. 
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7. What are the consequences of incorrect use of 453 C.P.C. ? 
Most cases have dismissed motions under 453 C.P.C. with costs where 
the judge considered the remedy inappropriate. ' l 0 However, that this is not a 
necessary consequence is clear from Art. 455 which states : 
455 : The court seized of the motion may, if it thinks fit, allow a contestation in 
writing, or order the trial of any questions which it considers useful for the 
solution of the problems raised in the motion. 
This was applied in a Provincial Court case, Filion v. l'Assurance Vie 
Desjardins. ' ' ' There is no doubt that, if unsuccessful motions were simply 
sent down for ordinary trial with costs of a motion and not a whole case, the 
fear that some lawyers still feel about proceeding under 453 C.P.C. would 
dissipate. Given the wide powers of amendment accepted in out Courts " 2 , 
even where the conclusions have to be modified substantially this should not 
stand in the way of appropriate modification. 
It is true that in Motel Fontaine Bleue v. Commission de Capitale 
Nationale Chevalier J. said at Page 264 : 
Il est également vrai que, dans l'arrêt Ste-Agathe précité, M. le juge Pigeon 
opine, comme obiter dictum, qu'un juge peut toujours, s'il croit que l'on abuse 
de cette procédure, ordonner que l'affaire soit instruite comme s'il s'agissait 
d'une action. Je suis cependant convaincu que cette opinion, valable s'il 
s'agissait d'un cas où il existe une question litigieuse mixte de droit et de faits, ne 
recevrait point application dans un procès, comme celui qui est devant moi, où 
ce qui m'est demandé consiste à entendre la preuve de part et d'autre et à 
décider, à sa lumière, si l'intimée a effectivement consenti une prolongation de 
bail.113 
It is submitted that this restrictive position is not correct. No logical 
reason exists for refusing to convert an application under 453 C.P.C. Into an 
action. " 4 
Fortunately, restrictive interpretations have become less frequent with 
the years. Cases like Protestant School Board"5 are balanced by dicta in 
110. Numerous cases cited above illustrate this. 
111. Filion v. l'Assurance Vie Desjardins, C.P., Joliette, 705-02-006200-856. 
112. See Joyal v. La Caisse Populaire Ste-Claire, [1986] R.J.Q. 2000 per Bernier J. as an 
example, Solosky, supra. In. 28 also gives us some idea of the scope of modifications of 
conclusions. 
113. Motel Fontaine Bleue v. Commission de Capitale Nationale, [1979] CS. 261. 
114. The Motel Fontaine Bleue, supra, fn. 110 case is particularly restrictive in its tone and its 
attempt to preserve pre-Duquel jurisprudence. 
115. Protestant School Board, supra, fn. 19. 
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Canada Steamship Lines "6, Gauthier "7 and La Chambre des Huissiers. "8 
If 453 is only an alternative procedure and not a source of substantive 
rights, cases should not frequently be dismissed on its account "9. Moreover, 
where 453 is cause for dismissal of an administrative law application, if it is 
taken again, "due diligence" required by law should be counted from the date 
of the 453 application. Once again, this would ensure justice on the merits and 
should remove procedural fears. I2° 
Conclusion 
Ten years have not reversed or substantially lessened the impact of 
Duquel. I2> The remedy under Section 453 is largely available. Procedural 
wrangling has become far less common, and more cases in public law are 
decided on their merits. 
However, there is a constant undercurrent of "restrictive" judgments. 
Many judges and lawyers appear to have been attached to the widespread use 
of procedure as a way of solving disputes. Especially in administrative law, 
where almost every successful application for review has major policy 
implications, many judges and lawyers find the possibility of deciding or 
arguing on procedural grounds attractive. For the respondents, this 
possibility always represents a cheap and easy shot at every Petitioner who, is 
characteristically financially weaker and less able to absorb the costs of 
successive applications. 
There seems to subsist considerable controversy about the notion of 
"immediate interest" and "real difficulty". It is submitted that the best way to 
make sense of these terms is to accept that "interest" has the same meaning as 
anywhere in the law, but that, in order for the relief to be granted, the Court 
must be convinced that the problem is a "real one" and not an invented 
116. Canada Steamship Lines, supra, fn. 22. 
117. Gauthier, supra, fn. 35. 
118. La Chambre des Huissiers, supra, fn. 36. 
119. That 453 C. P.C. is only a question of procedure and not a source of .substantive rights can be 
seen in In Re l'Édifice Ix- Si-Laurent lnc..[ 1979] C.A. 602 where Owen J. A. affirms at pages 
607-608 that the article applies to proceedings in bankruptcy. If it were a substantive article, 
this would not be so. 
120. There seems to be no caselaw on this point. 
121. Duquel, supra, fn. 2. See also L. SARNA, "Declaratory Judgments : Justice in the Fast 
Lane", (1985) I Admin. Law J. I. 
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hypothetical one m and that the relief will be effective in terminating the 
dispute and not simply in disposing of a portion of it. m 
Despite the great progress since 1977, it would still be desirable to 
institute a simple and accessible "application for judicial review" with 
minimal procedural refinements and almost no opportunity for contestation 
on technical grounds. Art. 453 would remain as a remedy in private law where 
it should be given the boardest possible interpretation in order to provide a 
quick solution to appropriate cases. It is likely, however, that in private law 
only it would attract far less controversy. 
122. I.e., that there is a "real difficulty". It is to be noted that in Weilzmanv. CilyofWeslmount, 
S.C. 500-05-010606-869, Benoit J. held that interest under 453 is easier to establish than 
under the rest of the law. At pages 4-5 the Court received an intervention in part for the 
following reasons : 
L'autre motif pour lequel je suis disposé à recevoir les interventions tient aux conclusions 
recherchées par la requérante. Celle-ci ne se contente pas d'attaquer en nullité la décision 
de la Ville et de solliciter un mandamus en ce qui concerne l'approbation de son plan de 
subdivision, elle recherche une déclaration de droit. J'estime qu'en matière déclaratoire, 
par analogie avec les articles 453 et 562 C.P.C. les voisins immédiats alléguant préjudice 
possèdent l'intérêt requis pour intervenir. Vouloir faire déclarer que le plan proposé est 
conforme à toute législation valide met en jeu bien plus que l'intérêt de la Ville comme 
autorité municipale défendant son règlement. 
It is submitted that this is just as dangerous as imposing a more onerous concept of 
"interest". If 453 C.P.C. is a question of procedure, its use or the use of another procedure 
should not affect the substance. 
123. I.e., that the interest is "immediate". Immediacy may also imply a certain degree of 
"urgency". 
